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Kako so razvite države zopet nategnile Afriko (3055 bralcev)
Torek, 9. 8. 2005
Erik



Minil je dober mesec dni, od kar so veliki beli možje na svojem rednem srečanju kluba G8 tokrat v škotskem Edinburgu črni celini obljubili navidez znatno pomoč v boju proti revščini. Najbolj razvite države so se zavezale, da bodo v naslednjih letih podvojile pomoč Afriki na skupnih 50 milijard dolarjev, medtem ko naj bi bili najrevnejšim štirinajstim afriškim državam v celoti odpisani zunanji dolgovi, ki znašajo okoli 40 milijard. Glamoruzno humanitarno predstavo, v kateri so sodelovali zvezdniki, politiki in protestniki, so na koncu povsem zasenčili londonski bombni napadi in Afrika se je kmalu spet znašla na dnu svetovnega zanimanja. V terorističnih napadih tako ni ugasnilo le 52 nedolžnih življenj, temveč tudi resnica o tem, da je obljubljena pomoč Afriki zgolj orodje za nadaljnje izkoriščanje črnega kontinenta.

Začnimo kar pri odpisu dolgov. Številne razvite države že od začetka nasprotujejo tej zamisli in jo poskušajo sabotirati s pomočjo Mednarodnega denarnega sklada. Še preden je sploh prišlo do srečanja G8, se je belgijski predstavnik v MDS-u, Willy Kiekens, v internem dokumentu zavzel za ohranitev dolgov, medtem ko naj bi najrevnejšim pomagali izključno z novimi subvencijami. Te seveda ne bi bile brez standardnih pogojev. Države prejemnice bi se tako morale vnaprej zavezati k spoštovanju predpisov Mednarodnega denarnega sklada. V kolikor jim ne bi uspelo izpeljati zaukazanih neoliberalnih reform, bi jih MDS kaznoval s tem, da bi jim odtegnil subvencije. Ta predlog v svoji osnovi legalizira kruto izsiljevanje celotnih držav, ki bi tako še naprej plitvo dihale v krčevitem oprijemu Mednarodnega denarnega sklada.

Za zdaj je jasno, da so Kiekensov interni dokument že podprli njegovi kolegi iz Nizozemske, Švice in Norveške. Nemogoče je, da bi male države uspele sabotirati sporazum kluba G8 brez podpore večjih, toda nezadovoljstvo nad popolnim odpisom dolgov najrevnejšim štirinajstim afriškim državam so pokazali tudi že nemški predstavniki v Mednarodnem denarnem skladu. Treba je tudi vedeti, da dane obljube kluba G8 same po sebi ne pomenijo nič, saj izvedba načrta tako imenovane pomoči Afriki leži v rokah Svetovne banke in MDS-a, skratka dveh glavnih sponzorjev revščine na črnem kontinentu.

Do prvih nejasnosti med Svetovno banko ter Mednarodnim denarnim skladom na eni strani in najrazvitejšimi državami na drugi je že prišlo in sicer glede vprašanja, kdo bo financiral kampanjo odpisa dolgov in razdelitve denarne pomoči. Evropske države se zavzemajo, da bi stroške projekta pokril MDS s prodajo svojih zlatih rezerv, to idejo pa bosta zagotovo blokirali Kanada in ZDA, saj bi nenadna pocenitev zlata na globalnem trgu ogrozila njune lastne rezerve zlata.

Še eno stvar je treba razčistiti glede morebitnega odpisa dolgov. Zvezdnika in humanitarna ambasadorja Bono ter Bob Geldof sta po srečanju kluba G8 vzhičeno ponavljala, da se bo na desetine milijonov Afričanov zbudilo v nov dan brez dolgov na svojih plečih. To je oslarija, ki ustvarja vtis, da bo do tega prišlo preko noči, medtem ko je prav nasprotno res. Proces odpisa starih dolgov naj bi trajal celih 40 let, kar pomeni, da bosta Svetovna banka in MDS ohranila svojo diktaturo nad afriškim gospodarstvom še za štiri desetletja, v tem času pa bo dovolj priložnosti za nove zadolžitve.

Napačni vtisi in razlage obkrožajo tudi obljubljeno denarno pomoč Afriki, ki znaša 50 milijard dolarjev. V resnici je le okoli polovica tega denarja dejansko novega. Razvite države so se poleg tega tudi že večkrat dokazale za izjemno šibke v dostavi obljubljene pomoči. ZDA so se na primer leta 2002 zavezale, da bodo namenile 5 milijard dolarjev za afriški razvoj. V treh letih jim je uspelo v sklopu tega projekta, imenovanega Millenium Challenge Account, dostaviti manj kot 20 milijonov dolarjev, ki so jih vložile v bizarno privatizacijo zemlje na Madagaskarju. Vodja projekta Millenium Challenge Account, strokovnjak za razvoj Paul Applegarth, je odstopil zaradi frustracije. Podobnih zgodb je še mnogo.

Poleg tega naj bi denarno pomoč prejele le države z dobro in demokratično vlado. Pojem 'demokratično' se v tem primeru nanaša predvsem na boj proti korupciji, toda kaj dejansko pomeni 'dobra vlada'? V zadnjih petnajstih letih je v vodilnih institucijah novega svetovnega reda prevladala definicija, da je dobra vlada tista, ki ustvarja dobro ozračje za gospodarske investicije, kar med drugim zajema privatizacijo javnih sektorjev, kot so zdravstvo, šolstvo ter pokojninski sistem. 'Dobra vlada' tujim investitorjem omogoči privatizacijo vodnih ter električnih virov in drugih naravnih bogastev. Zaradi politike 'dobrih vlad', ki jih sponzorirata Svetovna banka ter MDS, se revščina med prebivalstvom še dodatno poglablja iz leta v leto. Iz tega vidika obljubljena pomoč Afriki ni nič drugega kot zagotavljanje nadaljnje vladavine neoliberalne politike na črnem kontinentu.

Nešteto afriških nevladnih organizacij, aktivistov in strokovnjakov opozarja, da je bila Afrika ponovno izdana, vendar njihovih besed tu ne slišimo, ker so jih že na samem začetku preglasili vzkliki po boju proti terorizmu. Mesec dni po londonskih napadih je Afrika sedaj že pasé. Stvari se odvijajo dalje. Britanci trenutno skupaj z Američani opozarjajo Savdijce, da jih bodo vsak čas doleteli teroristični napadi. Iraška morija se nadaljuje. Bob Geldof in Bono sta poniknila in ne bomo ju videli do naslednjega humanitarnega spektakla. V Afriki pa je medtem vse po starem. Kakor da srečanja predstavnikov kluba G8 sploh ni bilo. In če si še enkrat od blizu pogledamo rezultate, ga dejansko tudi ni bilo.


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Erik [09/08/2005]

Prilagam interna dokumenta, ki sta iz pisarn Mednarodnega denarnega sklada po ´skrivnih kanalih´ prišla do rok aktivistov iz organizacije ´Jubilee Debt Campaign´. Avtor prvega dokumenta je belgijski predstavnik v MDS-u, Willy Kiekens, drugega pa so s skupnimi konjskimi močmi spisali Kiekensovi švicarski, norveški in nizozemski kolegi.
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    Made to the IMF Executive Board meeting June 22nd 2005
    Statement by Mr Willy Kiekens (IMF) [09/08/2005]
    "I agree that, as long as the Board has not acted upon the G8 proposal of debt cancellation for HIPC countries, Fund operations with poor countries should continue according to present rules and policies. And obviously, countries should continue to service their debt to the Fund, in full and on time. The G8 proposal for debt cancellation is very important for the countries that could benefit from it, for the functioning of the Fund in the future, and for the donors who will have to contribute to its financing. These proposals should be carefully examined by the Board after a detailed and in depth assessment by the staff. I welcome the confirmation by Management that the staff stands ready to add to this assessment any alternative proposals or proposed modifications to the G8 Ministers in a constructive way, with the aim of improving it where possible. It is in this spirit that, in today’s formal meeting, I would like to reiterate the proposals which I formulated last Friday during the informal meeting, and expand on them. The G8 stress the need for good governance, accountability and transparency on the part of countries whose debt is cancelled. In order to ensure that the fundamental objectives of the debt cancellation are achieved, and to make the adherence to these conditions operational, I would like to suggest the following alternative proposal. Rather than giving full, irrevocable and unconditional debt relief at the time of the completion point for the amounts that remain due to the Fund, I would suggest that we amend the PRGF instrument in order to allow the Fund to enter into a new kind of arrangement with completion point countries and others that become eligible for debt cancellation. Under this new type of PRGF arrangement, countries would not receive new loans, but grants equal to the amount of the service of their remaining debt to the Fund. This alternative operation would have the same financial effects for the beneficiary countries as those stated in the G8 ministers’ proposal. However it would enable the Fund to continue having active policy dialogues with poor countries, monitor their policies closely and provide financial support in a phased manner and on condition of the implementation of adequate policies. Everybody recognizes that PRGF arrangements have been very useful until now. They would continue to be so by, under such arrangements, providing grants for amounts equal to the debt service to the Fund over the next ten years. Of course, it may be that countries would not be able to stay the course of a new PRGF arrangement, because of policy slippages or political instability. That would be a cause for concern. It is clearly the intention of the G8 ministers to make sure that policies in the countries that benefit from the newly proposed extraordinary debt relief would remain responsible. Therefore, under my proposal, if a new type of PRGF programme goes off track, the expected grant financing would not be made available. However, we could consider the possibility that during a limited period of time - say three years - the country would nonetheless receive postponement of repayment of debt to the Fund, while servicing the interest. But, if the country´s policies go off track for a prolonged period, it would have to serve the debt it owes to the Fund. I invite the staff and Directors to reflect further on this proposal. The financing of the proposed debt cancellation raises several difficult questions. First, as I mentioned last Friday, the resources of the Special Disbursement Account can only be used to assist poor countries on a uniform basis. The criterion that some countries benefited from HIPC debt relief is not a relevant criterion for favouring those countries by giving them full debt cancellation above other equally poor and equally indebted countries. I invite the staff to consider this issue further. Second, the G8 proposal covers four different categories of debt, without making a clear distinction among them. The amount of SDR 4.1 billion mentioned in the G8 proposal includes 1) debt that is already definitively cancelled for countries that have reached the HIPC completion point; 2) debt for which cancellation is already decided, but not yet definitively obtained 3) debt that is eligible for cancellation under the HIPC initiative but for which no decision has yet been taken 4) debt that, until now, has not been the subject of any possible cancellation. For the first three debt categories, the Fund has been provisioned for all the needed financing. For the fourth category, we need to identify new sources of financing. I suggest that the staff should inform the Board about the exact amount of each of these four categories of debt. In principle, there is no need to change the financing of the HIPC operations under the present rules. We should focus on how to finance the cancellation of debt not covered by the HIPC. My rough estimate shows that this fourth category of debt amounts to about SDR 2.5 billion in nominal terms. Indeed, about SDR 1.6 billion included in the G8 proposal relates to debt covered by the HIPC Initiative. Earlier in my intervention, I suggested that the Fund forego the SDR 2.5 billion (not covered by the HIPC) as the amounts fall due in the course of the next 10 years, within the framework of new style PRGF arrangements. Hence, the net present value of this future stream of grants (equivalent to the debt service) would probably be less than SDR 2 billion (using a discount rate of 5 percent). But, the Fund would of course need to subsidize the interest on the outstanding PRGF loans as they would not be cancelled fully at the completion point. Operationa lly this implies 1) The SDR 500 million, posted in the so-called ´umbrella accounts´ of countries that have reached the completion point, would remain dedicated to the debt cancellation under the HIPC Initiative. 2) The SDR 2.2 billion in the Special Disbursement Account would continue to serve for the partial financing of the HIPC debt, through the interest earned on this principal until about 2011 or 2012. Until that year, the present burden sharing mechanism designed to generate SDR 94 million annually by creditor and debtor countries would remain in effect. After that date we would consider unwinding the off market gold transactions by using the principal amount of SDR 2.2 billion in the SDA to pay off an equal amount of fund liabilities to creditor countries. This would protect the Fund budget from a permanent interest burden on SDR 2.2 billion that would result from the implementation of the G8 proposal. 3) The use of SDR 1 billion out of the PRGF subsidy account to finance debt cancellation instead of subsidising PRGF loans, as proposed by the G8, could be avoided. This would save us the need to obtain the unanimous consent of all donors to the PRGF subsidy account. Indeed, as I explained a few moments ago, the outstanding PRGF loans would not be immediately cancelled, and, therefore, would need to be subsidized largely as planned. But the counterpart of this continued subsidisation would be that a lower amount would be needed for debt cancellation in net present value terms, as explained earlier. 4) Finally, we need to generate about SDR 2 billion to finance, during the next ten years, the cancellation of debt not covered by the HIPC Initiative. Since the G8 ministers assurance that the financing of their proposal should not negatively affect the operation of the fund, not their financing, I suggest that w consider selling gold for an amount that would generate a capital gain equal to about SDR 2 billion. Of course, this amount would need to be higher if for reasons of equal treatment we were to decide to cancel all the debt to the Fund by PRGF eligible countries, and not only the debt of HIPC eligible countries. Mr Chairman, these are rather technical and complex issues. It would be useful if they are thoroughly examined by the staff. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
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      Memo from Belgian, Dutch, Norwegian and Swiss IMF Executive Directors 30.6.2005
      IMF staff [09/08/2005]
      Subject: Proposal for debt cancellation – suggestions for elaboration by staff During the Board meeting on June 22, 2005, we stressed the importance of clarifying several questions and concerns that the G8 proposal raises for the Fund. Most of these issues have been captured well in the draft Summing Up of the meeting. Building on our comments on that occasion, we would appreciate that the staff take up the following points for elaboration. These suggestions are not exhaustive and do not prejudge what our position will be based on the further work by staff. 1. Conditi onality is a key feature for effective use of resources that are freed up by debt relief. A concrete proposal was made during the Board meeting for providing 100 per cent debt service relief in a phased manner linked to appropriate conditionality in the context of a programme framework. We would appreciate if staff could elaborate what kind of conditionality and framework could be envisaged, so that it is compatible with ongoing PRGFs in all country categories involved (pre-decision, pre-completion, post-completion). As part of the subject of conditionality, there is the question of how to reconcile debt relief and debt sustainability. For long-term debt sustainability, the period following debt relief will be crucial. The new debt sustainability framework for low-income countries provides little guidance for assessing borrowing and debt patterns for countries receiving 100 per cent debt service relief. Ongoing conditionality may offer a basis for judgement as to what borrowing and debt pattern will be appropriate for such countries. We would appreciate if staff could elaborate further on this latter suggestion and possible additional policy changes that would be necessary to take into account the challenges posed by these countries. 2. Uniformity of country treatment is a key principle if Fund resources are to be used instead of bilateral contributions. We would appreciate if staff could elaborate what the proposed resource envelope of the G8 proposal (SDR 4.1 billion) would imply in terms of debt service relief, if allocated to completion point HIPC countries and possibly other PRGF eligible countries in an approach judged by staff to be adequate given the principles underlying the relevant sources of financing. Scenarios for debt service relief for this larger group of countries could differentiate between the attainable percentage of debt service relief on the one hand, and the attainable number of years of debt service relief on the other. 3. Ensuring that the financing capacity of the Fund is not reduced is a key tenet of the G8 initiative. We look forward to a detailed presentation of the financial implications for the Fund, the PRGF Trust and the PRGF/HIPC Trust of the current G8 proposal, the above mentioned suggestions and possible alternatives (including financing possibilities in lieu of using the corpus of the 1999 off-market gold transactions). 4. Poli cy implications. We would appreciate an assessment of the specific implications of the debt cancellation proposals on the three outstanding policy papers on low-income countries. We would also appreciate an analysis of the effectiveness of the various debt relief modalities, including the above-mentioned suggestions, for sustainable development in the countries concerned. As a general point, as the G8 proposal is designed differently for the World Bank and the IMF, staff should consider the feasibility and implications of having different approaches to debt relief and conditionality for the two institutions. Memo from three African IMF Executive Directors 5th July 2005 As Directors representing sub-Saharan Africa, we fully support the G8 proposal for a 100 percent debt cancellation operation. We agree with the G8 and believe that such an operation would import substantial impulse to the economic growth of the HIPC countries and would indeed allow them to meet MDGs by the target date. By the same token, we are of the view that a piece-meal and gradual operation under a proposed modified PRGF instrument would not generate the same growth impetus nor will it have the same beneficial impact in terms of MDGs. During the 22nd June meting of the Executive Board, a number of issues related to the G8 proposal were identified for further elaboration by management and deliberation by the Board. While we are open to consideration of various financing options to operationalise the G8 proposal and are willing to consider ways and means of addressing the concerns of the G8 on ´governance, accountability and transparency,´ we are concerned about proposals put forward in the recent memo of colleagues (Messrs Kiekens, Kremers, Solheim, and Zurbrugg) to you dated June 30, 2005. Of particular concern to our authorities are the issue of conditionality proposed in the memo as well as the implied dates for effectiveness of the debt cancellation. While we would have been prepared to await management´s response to all the issues, the recent memo prompted us to place our concerns on record. A. Debt Cancellation and Conditionality In their proposal for debt cancellation, the G8 indicated the following: "We ask the World Bank and IMF to report to us on improvements on transparency on all sides and on the drive against corruption so as to ensure that all resources are used for poverty reduction. We believe that good governance, accountability and transparency are crucial to realising the benefits of debt cancellation. We commit to ensure this is reaffirmed in future bilateral and multilateral assistance to these countries." This statement does not suggest new conditionality, it only requires an assessment of improvements in transparency and fighting corruption in order to ensure that debt cancellation is used for poverty reduction. This may appear as a prior condition, however it is not. Eligibility is defined by reaching the completion point (see footnote 1 of FO/DIS/05/79) where the concerned countries would have met a whole set of elements in the conditionality matrix. The only condition put for delivery of debt cancellation for IDA and AfDF is being current with repayment obligations. Moreover, since the G8 proposal is presented as a complement to the HIPC framework, it is important to note that debt relief under the HIPC Initiative is irrevocable once a member implements the required conditionality by the completion point. Therefore, it does not seem appropriate that debt cancellation would reintroduce conditionality beyond the completion point. It would appear that, reasonably, conditionality understood as a priori assessment of transparency and anti-corruption drive could apply only to the cancellation of the stock of debt not covered under the HIPC Initiative or to the debt of countries that have not yet reached the decision point. The debt of countries that have reached the decision point but not yet the completion point should not be subject to conditionality additional to that laid out at the decision point. B. Debt Cancellation and standard of "Upper Credit Tranche Conditionality" In the design of Fund-supported programmes and choice of conditionality under the GRA and/or PRGF, the Fund applies two basic principles: i) to provide assurances to the member regarding the availability of resources by identifying conditions required for drawings at the outset of the arrangement, and ii) to "establish safeguards for the temporary use of the general resources of the Fund." Through the implementation of the standard of ´upper credit tranche conditionality´, the Fund seeks to design a programme with policies strong enough to qualify as safeguards for se of Fund resources beyond the first 25 percent of quota so that the improvement in the balance of payments situation allows repurchases as scheduled. The implementation of debt cancellation will have an important implication for Fund´s relations with LICs. The application of the standard of ´upper credit tranche conditionality´ to countries receiving 100 percent debt relief does not seem appropriate under the present rules since the ´safeguards for the temporary use of the general resources of the Fund´, which are at the root of conditionality, do not apply in a debt cancellation framework. C. Effectiveness of the debt cancellation Consistent with the objective of making new assistance from the IMF/IDA/AfDB in the form of grants, the G8 debt cancellation proposal is for one-off cancellation. Any attempt toward tranching or phasing of the cancellation, in addition to the issue of conditionality referred to above, would raise the question of the basis on which future assistance will be granted. It would also delay the benefits to eligible members.
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        Re: Memo from Belgian, Dutch, Norwegian and Swiss IMF Executive Directors 30.6.2
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